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Abstract
Demand uncertainty is characterized by letting the mar-
ket demand function shift randomly but continuously through
time according to a stochastic process. Thus the firm knows
its current demand, but does not know what demand will be in
the future. The firm can adjust some factor inputs freely
in response to stochastic changes in demand, but other fac-
tors are "quasi-fixed" in that adjustment costs are incurred
when they are changed. We show that the risk-neutral firm
will (in expected value terms) produce more (less) if mar-
ginal adjustment costs are rising at an increasing (decreasing)
rate, and that risk aversion causes the firm to produce more
under demand uncertainty. These results hold whether the
firm is competitive or monopolistic, whether or not the firm
holds inventories, and whether uncertainty affects demand
additively or multiplicatively.
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Adjustment Costs, Demand Uncertainty, and
the Behavior of the Firm
1. Introduction
This paper takes a new look at the behavior of the firm facing de-
mand uncertainty. As in earlier studies, we are concerned with the ef-
fects of uncertainty on the firm's output and pricing decisions. How-
ever, our characterization of uncertainty is quite different from the
usual one in which demand is simply not known at the time an output (or
pricing) decision is made.
We model demand uncertainty in a dynamic context by assuming that
the market demand function shifts randomly but continuously through time
according to a stochastic process. Thus, although today's demand is
known exactly, future demand may be larger or smaller, and has a variance
that increases with the time horizon. We combine this characterization
of uncertainty with a dynamic model of the firm in which some factor in-
puts can be adjusted freely in response to stochastic demand changes, but
other factors are "quasi-fixed" in that adjustment costs are incurred when
they are changed.
In such a world the firm's capacity, price, and level of sales will
be random processes, but there are a number of questions to be asked about
the firm's behavior in expected value terms. In particular, should the
presence of uncertainty cause competitive or monopolisitic firms to pro-
duce more or less than they would otherwise? How are the effects of un-
certainty influenced by the presence of risk aversion? And how would
the use of inventories alter the impact of demand uncertainty on capacity
and sales?
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These question have of course been addressed by others in the past.
Among the earliest and best known studies of demand uncertainty are those
of Mills (1959,1962) and Karlin and Carr (1962). Mills examined a single-
period monopolistic firm that sets both output and price in the face of
additive demand uncertainty (i.e. the demand function is of the form
q = q(p) + u where u is a random variable), and showed that the uncertainty
leads to a lower price if marginal cost is constant (so that the firm re-
duces the expected loss from discarding unsold production). Karlin and
Carr confirmed, both for the static case and the multi-period case with in-
ventory carry-over, that additive uncertainty tends to reduce the price and
increase the output of a risk-neutral firm, while multiplicative uncertainty
does just the opposite.
Several papers have appeared since, and have been concerned with such
issues as the way in which the error term enters the demand function (ad-
ditively, multiplicatively, or nonlinearly), the implications of choosing
price ex ante instead of output, the implications of risk adversion, and
the use of inventories. For example, Sandmo (1971) and Baron (1970) showed
that a risk-averse competitive firm will produce less when the price is
a random variable or subject to an additive error term, but a risk-neutral
firm will not alter it production.1 Leland (1972) extended these results
1 - These papers ignored the firm's choice of factor inputs under uncertainty
and the implications of that choice for output. Batra and Ullah (1974) showed
that Sandmo's results hold if all factor inputs are chosen at the same time
(before price is observed). However, Hartman (1976) showed that if one ("quasi-
fixed") input is chosen before price is observed while the second is chosen
afterwards, nonlinearities in the production function can lead to a higher or
lower output for a risk-neutral firm. Also, Young (1979) recently argued that
demand should be proportionately more uncertain the greater the elasticity of
expected demand (and the more competitive the market), and showed that (with
risk-neutral firms) this can lead to prices that are higher in competitive
than monopolistic markets if inventory and shortage costs are high enough.
III
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to a monopolistic firm whose demand can depend in a general way on a random
error term (e.g. q = q(p,u)), and showed that uncertainty reduces the pro-
duction of a risk-averse firm that sets quantity ex ante and price ex
post, and can raise (lower) the price of a firm that sets price ex ante if
marginal cost is increasing (decreasing). Finally, Zabel (1972) worked
with a multi-period monopoly model with inventory carry-over, and showed
that (as in the Karlin and Carr paper) if a firm faces additive demand un-
certainty in each period output tends to be lower, while with multiplicative
uncertainty it tends to be higher.2
In all of these models, whether single- or multi-period, current demand
is unknown (i.e. is subject to an error term) each time an output or pricing
decision is made. While actual firms do in fact face some uncertainty over
their current demand functions, they face much more uncertainty over the
future evolution of demand. As time passes new competitive substitutes may
appear on the market, the prices of existing competitive (and complementary)
goods are likely to fluctuate, income and population will grow at unpre-
dictable rates, and of course tastes are likely to change, again unpredictably.
Thus the demand function that the firm faces today is relatively certain com-
pared to the one it will face one or two years from now, and the firm's un-
certainty over future demand is greater the farther into the future it looks.
Of course if the firm can adjust its capacity freely, uncertainty over
future demand should not influence its current behavior. But for most
firms output flexibility is limited in the short run, and changes in ca-
pacity involve significant adjustment costs. While the use of inventories
might reduce the need to make capacity adjustments, it is unlikely to
eliminate it, so'that most firms must regularly make investment decisions
2 - Amihud and Mendelson (1979) recently developed a model similar to Zabel's,
but with additive error terms affecting output as well as demand in each period.
L___IIJ_^_·___L___---L -----a 
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that take into account short-run fluctuations in demand as well as the
(even greater) uncertainties affecting long-run demand.
The model presented in this paper is therefore an inherently dynamic
one, and captures these basic characteristics of demand uncertainty and ad-
justment costs. The results obtained from the model are different from those
of earlier studies, and tend to be quite robust. For example, we show that
risk-neutral firms will (in-expected value terms) produce more (less) if mar-
ginal adjustment costs are rising at an increasing (decreasing) rate. We
also show that the risk-averse firm will produce more under demand uncer-
tainty. These results hold whether the firm is competitive or monopolistic,
whether or not the firm holds inventories, and whether uncertainty affects
demand additively or multiplicatively.
The basic model is set forth in the next section. In Section 3 we
briefly review the behavior of the model when there is no uncertainty; this
will make it easier to understand the stochastic solution. The stochastic
version of the model is solved and discussed in Sections 4 and 5 for the
case where the firm holds no inventories, and in Section 6 we discuss the
use of inventories and show that it does not change the basic results. The last
section contains a summary of the results and some concluding remarks.
2. The Basic Model
We model demand uncertainty by letting the demand function be driven
by a stochastic process with independent increments (an Ito process). In
particular, we write demand as
p = p[q,e(t)] (1)
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with p/3q < 0, ap/ae > 0, and (t) a stochastic process of the form
de = (6e)dz = (0)£(t) VE (2)
where £ (t) is a serially uncorrelated normal random variable with zero
mean and unit variance (i.e. dz describes a Wiener process).3
Equations (1) and (2) imply that uncertainty about demand grows with
the time horizon, and that fluctuations in demand occur continuously over
time. No jumps in 0(t) are possible (although over any finite time period
any change in of finite size is possible). Also, note that eqn. (1)
puts no restrictions on the way in which enters the demand function. For
a monopolistic firm it can enter additively, multiplicatively, or nonlinearly.
For a competitive firm eqn. (1) becomes p = a + a (t) (for which p = 
is a special case), and can be additive, multiplicative, or both.
The firm can react to stochastic fluctuations in demand by changing
its factor inputs and thus its capacity. However, for at least some factors
this will involve adjustment costs. In this paper we assume that labor is
a "flexible" input (i.e. can be adjusted freely), but capital is "quasi-
fixed," so that the purchase and installation of "usable" capital at a
rate I involves a cost vI + C(I), where v is the purchase price of a unit
of capital equipment, and C(I) is the full adjustment cost, with C'(I) > 0
and C"(I) > 0. Here C(I) includes the cost of installing the capital,
training workers to use it, etc. Since this takes time, C"(I) > 0, i.e.
it is more costly to increase the stock of usable capital quickly than
3 - Equation (2) is the limiting form as h -+ 0 of the discrete-time ifference
equation (t + h) - (t) = (e)(t) , and E[dO] = 0 and Var[dO] = a ()dt.
If (8) = a, then follows a simple random walk. If (8) = a, will be
log-normally distributed (and always positive). Note that eqn. (2) contains
no deterministic drift component; although most firms would anticipate some
deterministic componentof demand growth, we are interested here only in the
implications of stochastic fluctuations in demand. For an introduction to
stochastic processes of the form of (2), see Karlin and Taylor (1975).
__. I 
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slowly.4
Ignoring for the moment the possibility of holding inventories, we
can write the firm's instantaneous profit as:
(lit) = p(q,e)q - wL - vI - C(I) (3)
where w is the wage rate, and q = F(K,L) a strictly concave production func-
2
tion,i.e. FK> 0, F >, FKK < 0 F < 0, and F F - F > 0. TheLL KKLL KL
firm's capital stock is given by
K= I - K (4)
where 6 is the depreciation rate.
For the risk-neutral firm the problem is to choose L(t) and I(t) to
minimize the sume of discounted profits:
co
max p (t) -rtdt,
L,I
whereas the risk-averse firm maximizes the integral of discounted flow of
utility U(I), with U'(T) > 0 and U"(T) < 0. ' In either case the maximi-
4 - Lucas (1967a) showed that this description of adjustment costs is consistent
with the flexible accelerator model of investment demand. Alternatively (and
equivalently) we could have represented adjustment costs by writing the pro-
duction function as q = F(K,L,I), with FI < 0 and F < 0, i.e. firms must de-
vote internal resources (mainly labor) to the installation of and adaptation to
newly purchased capital. This representation was used by Lucas (1967b) to
analyze the effects of adjustment costs on competitive supply. The deterministic
model that we discuss in the next section is similar to his, but more general
in that we do not impose constant returns to scale.
5 - These objective functions ignore financial markets. An alternative ob-
jective is to maximize the equilibrium market value of the firm taking into
account the market value of risk. Meyer (1976) examined the effects of demand
uncertainty on a multi-product monopolist in a static context, and showed
that market value could be expressed as
V {E(nT - Ro
where r is the riskless interest rate, G is the standard deviation of pro-
.Tfit, R is the market value of unit of risk as measured by , and is the
correlation of the firm's profits with the overall market return.
6 - (next page)
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zation is subject to the ordinary differential equation (4), the stochastic
differential equation (2), and the conditions L(t), I(t) > 0.7
In Section 6 of this paper we add inventories to the model. If
N is the stock of inventory and k the storage cost, profit becomes
f(t) = p(q,e)q - wL - vI - C(I) - kN (3')
with the inventory stock given by
N= X - q (6)
where q is sales and X = F(K,L) is production. The firm now maximizes the
sum of discounted profit (or utility) by choosing L(t), I(t) and q(t), so
that p adjusts to clear the market.8 The maximization is subject to eqn. (6)
as well as (2) and (4), and the added conditionsthat N > 0 and q > 0.
6 - Note that this is an equilibrium model, i.e. price adjusts so that there
is never any excess supply or demand. A number of interesting disequilibrium
models have appeared recently, notably in papers by Carlton (1978) and Gould
(1978). There the emphasis is on price inflexibility, and the demand for a
good depends both on its price and on the probability that it can be pur-
chased. In such a case "market clearing" implies that there will always be
some customers unable to purchase the good.
7 - Note that the competitive (monopolistic) firm takes price (the demand
function) as exogenously given in performing the maximization. Any shifts in
price or demand are purely stochastic and cannot be predicted.
8 - Note that this is equivalent to choosing L(t), I(t) and p(t), with q(t)
adjusting to clear the market. Thus there is no longer any distinction be-
tween a quantity-setting and a price-setting firm, as in Leland (1972).
III
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3. The Deterministic Solution
Before solving the stochastic optimization problems outlined above,
let us briefly review the characteristics of the solution for the deterministic
case, i.e. for which = 0. We ignore inventories at first, and consider
a risk-neutral firm that maximizes (5) subject to (4) and the conditions that
L, I > 0. By straightforward application of the Maximum Principle it is
easy to show that the optimal levels of employment and investment are
given by
MR FL = w (7)
where MR = p -- q(ap/aq) is marginal revenue, and
= (I) {(r + 6)[v + C(I)] - MR*FK} (8)
Note that if adjustment costs were zero, i.e. C"(I) = 0, the capital stock would
be adjusted instantaneously so that its marginal revenue product would al-
ways equal its service price.
Eqn. (7) implies that L = L (K,w,p), so that by substitution L can
be eliminated from (8). The resulting equation, together with (4), describes
the dynamics of I and K. This is easiest to see from the phase diagram of
Figure 1. The I = 0 isocline is downwards sloping, and is shallower the
larger is C" (I). If C"(I) = 0 the isocline becomes a vertical line at K , so
that K adjusts instantaneously to this equilibrium level. IF C"(I) > > 0,
the isocline will be nearly horizontal, with I(t) always close to its equili-
brium value I = 6K , and adjustment of K to K taking place more slowly.
* * * *
But in general, if K(O) < K , I (t) > I and I < 0 (as in trajectory A),
and the opposite for K(O) > K .
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Suppose the firm is competitive so that MR = p, and in addition F(K,L)
exhibits constant returns to scale so that FK = FK(K /L ) is independent of
K. Then the I = 0 isocline is a horizontal line at I = I . As can be
*
seen from the phase diagram of Figure 2, I = 0 always, and the optimal in-
vestment policy is simply to set I(t) = 6K . Note, however, that even
though F(K,L) exhibits constant returns, the long-run total cost function
of the firm exhibits decreasing returns. The reason is that a higher equili-
brium level of output (and larger equilibrium capital stock) requires a
higher maintenance level of investment (I = 6K), which implies higher costs
of installation, etc.9
Note from eqn. (8) that whether or not F(K,L) exhibits constant re-
turns, the I = 0 isocline shifts upward if price or marginal revenue in-
creases, and shifts downwards if v,w,r or 6 increase. Now let us see how price,
output, and investment evolve in response to a sudden unanticipated in-
crease in demand. This is illustrated for the competitive firm with con-
stant returns in F(K,L) in Figures 3a and 3b. The short-run supply curve is
highly inelastic (only the labor input can be increased in the short run) so
that price, and therefore investment, immediately rise to levels higher than
their long-run equilibrium values. Then as the capital stock begins in-
creasing further, price falls, the I = 0 isoclir.e falls, and investment falls,
* * 10
asymtotically approaching its equilibrium value I = 6K .
9 - To have full constant returns (i.e. a horizontal long-run marginal cost
curve) we would write the adjustment cost function as C(I) = ~(I/K)I, with
~' > 0. However, this would complicate the algebra in the stochastic solution
without changing any of the basic results.
10 - The rate at which investment falls from I to I is found by differentiating
2
both sides of the equation defining the I = 0 isocline with respect to time:
(continued)
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Now suppose the firm can hold inventories. In this case the maxi-
mization is subject to eqn. (6), with N > 0, in addition to eqn. (4). The
solution is again obtained from straightforward application of the Maxi-
mum Principle. As before, eqn. (8) describes the dynamics of investment.
In addition, the existence of inventories limits the rate at which marginal
revenue (or for a competitive market, price) can rise:
MR < rMR + k (9)
and N = 0 unless (9) holds with equality. If N > 0, eqn. (9) simply says
that the total user cost of holding a unit of inventory is zero. That total
user cost is just the storage cost k, plus the amortized capital cost (in
terms of foregone marginal revenue) rMR, less the rate of capital gain MR.
In steady-state equilibrium MR = 0 and therefore no inventory is held.
(We will see in Section 5 that this is not the case when demand is subject
to stochastic fluctuations.) If in a competitive market demand increases
suddenly so that price jumps (as in Figure 3b), inventories cannot be ac-
cumulated, and certainly would not be held while price is falling. How-
ever if demand falls suddenly (so that price drops but later rises as
capital is decumulated), inventories may be held so that price later rises
at a rate no faster than rp + k. However what is important with respect
to the stochastic model is that while movements in price (sometimes
moderated by inventories) cause movements in the I = 0 isocline, eqn.
2
I= (r ) P(qI) (I - 6K) < 0
Thus I falls more rapidly the steeper is the demand curve, and less rapidly
(from a lower level) the larger are adjustment costs.
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(8) still describes the dynamics of investment given any price.
4. The Stochastic Solution
We now solve the stochastic version of the model for the case of no
inventories. Recall that the maximization of (5), with profits given by (3),
is now subject to the ordinary differential equation (4) and the stochastic
differential equation (2). We obtain a solution using stochastic dynamic
11
programming.
Define the optimal value function:
co
J = J(K,,t) = max Et d(T)dT (10)
L,t I
t
-rt
where fd(T) = (T)e . Note that J is a function of the state variable K
and the stochastic process , so the fundamental equation of optimality is:
0 = max[ d (t) + (l/dt)EtdJ]
L,I
= maxE Td(t) + Jt + (I - K)J + 1 (11)
L,I t K 2
Maximization with respect to L gives d/aL = 0, so that
MR FL = w (12)
11 - This paper makes use of stochastic dynamic programming and Ito's dif-
ferentiation rule for functions of stochastic processes. For a discussion
of these techniques, with applications to problems in economics, see Merton
(1971) and Chow (1979). Kushner (1967) provides a detailed treatment. The
solution approach used in this paper is similar to that in Pindyck (1980).
12 - We use the notation J = J/3K, etc. (l/dt)Etd( ) is Ito's differential
Kt
operator. For a discussion, see Kushner (1967), Merton (1971), or Chow (1979).
A clear derivation of the fundamental equation of optimalty in stochastic dynamic
programming is provided by Dreyfus (1965).
------ _ ~ ~~~_ _ - _ - ~ ~ ~ ~- _ --- - -------I~'~''-- __ ------- ·---
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as in the certainty case. Maximization with respect to I gives
-ad/3I = JK (13)
i.e. the undiscounted shadow price of an additional unit of capital should
just equal the marginal cost of purchase and adjustment for the unit.
Equation (12) and (13) could be substituted back into equation (11)
to yield a partial differential equation for J(K,e,t). Theoretically one
could solve that equation for J and then determine the optimal investment
trajectory I (t) explicitly from (13). In practice, however, the solution
of such a partial differential equation is usually not feasible. Instead our
approach is to eliminate J from the problem.
First, differentiate eqn. (11) with respect to K:
+ (14)
JKt + (I - K)J - 6JK + )J (14)7K + Kt KK K 2 K00
and using Ito's Lemma note that this can be re-written as:
Id/3K - 6JK + (l/dt)Etd(J K) =O (15)
We cannot differentiate both sides of eqn. (13) with respect to time
since both Td and J are functions of the stochastic process 8, so their
time derivativesdo not exist. Instead we use Ito's Lemma and apply the
differential operator (l/dt)Etd( ):
-(l/dt)E td(aI1 /I) (l/dt3E td(J (16)
Now combine eqns. (13), (15) and (16) to eliminate JK:
(l/dt)Etd (]d/aI) = and/aK + sa6d/aI (17)
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Equation (17) is a stochastic version of the Euler equation from the
calculus of variations. It is easiest to interpret in its integral form:
3nd E I d( d
- a tt aK + I dT (17')
which says that the marginal purchase and installation cost of a unit of
capital should equal the expected sum of all discounted future increases in
revenues from that unit were it not to depreciate less the expected sum of
future discounted costs associated with maintaining that unit as it depre-
ciates.
We can now use eqn. (17) to determine the expected dynamics of invest-
ment. Substitute the expression for discounted profit into (17) and divide
-rt
through by ert
r[v + C' (I)] - (l/dt)EtdC' (I) = MR FK - 6v - 6C' (I) (18)
Now expand dC'(I) using Ito's Lemma:
dC' (I) = C"(I)dI + 2C " ' 2(dI) (19).
Remember that I = I (K,e) along the optimal trajectory, so that (expanding
dI using Ito's Lemma) E [(dI) ] = a2 (e)Idt, and
12 2
EtdC'(I) = C"(I)EtdI + 2 a ()IOC" (I)dt (20)
Substituting (20) into (18) and rearranging, we obtain an equation des-
cribing the expected dynamics of investment that is analogous to eqn. (8)
from the deterministic case:
1lE dI 1C()( )v C'I -M FK 2 I---E dI -{(r +6)[v + C' (I)] -MRF KF - "' (I) (21)dt t C (I.) K 2
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5. The Effects of Uncertainty
Although price, production, and investment will fluctuate stochastically
in this model-, we can see from eqn. (21) that the expected rate of change
of investment will be the same as in the certainty case if C"' (I) = 0.
Furthermore, since the dynamics of K are still given by eqn. (4), the ex-
pected equilibrium capital stock, labor demand, and output will also be the
same as in the certainty case if C"' (I) = 0.
However, if C"' (I) > (<)O, i.e. if marginal adjustment cost is rising
at an increasing (decreasing) rate, then the expected equilibrium capital stock
and output level will be higher (lower). To see this, suppose C"' (I) > 0.
We do not have an analytical expression for I , but clearly I > 0.13 Thus
an increase in a (i.e. more uncertainty over future demand) has the same ef-
fect on price as an increase in marginal revenue - it shifts the (1/dt)EtdI = 0
isocline upwards and to the right, as shown in Figure 4. Note that with a > 0,
K and I fluctuate stochastically around (and may drift away from) their
equilibrium values. But the expected equilibrium capital stock, and thus out-
put level, are clearly larger.
This deviation from the certainty case occurs for a simple reason. Sup-
pose the firm is competitive, C"' (I) > 0, and random increases and decreases in
8 occur that balance each other out, so that price does not drift from its
average value. These fluctuations in will cause fluctuations in I, but
with C"' (I) > 0, increases in I raise marginal adjustment costs more than
decreases in I lower them. The firm therefore has an incentive to maintain
13 - In fact we know that I > 0 since an increase in raises the marginal
revenue product of capital, the desired capital stock, and both the short-run
and equilibrium levels of investment.
III
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a larger stock of capital and thereby reduce the amount by which K (and
thus I) must be increased when increases, so that this component of ad-
justment costs is reduced.1 4
This is illustrated graphically in Figure 5, and mathematically by
eqn. (22) below:
MR-FK + 12 a (e)I C"' (I) = (r +)[v + C'(I)] (22)
This equation defines the (l/dt) EtdI = 0 isocline, and says that in equili-
brium (i.e. where the only changes in I and Kare from stochastic fluctuations
in demand), the user cost of a marginal unit of capital (the right hand side
of the equation) should be equated to a marginal benefit that now has two
components. That benefit equals the marginal revenue product of capital, plus
the expected reduction in marginal adjustment costs that result from the extra
unit of capital.
Long-run marginal and average costs are shown for a = 0 (MC© ) and a > 0
(MC1 ) in Figure 5. As explained above, with C"' (I) > 0 stochastic fluctuations
create a positive expected "quasi-fixed cost" of adjustment, which is re-
duced by maintaining a higher capital stock, but not eliminated. Thus sto-
chastic fluctuations reduce long-run marginal cost, but increase average
cost, so that the firm produces more, but earns a smaller profit.1 5
14 - Of course if the firm knew that increases and decreases in 8 were going
to balance out and leave price unchanged on average, it could simply keep I and
K fixed and avoid the whole problem. But since fluctuations in are in fact
stochastic so that price may drift, the firm (if it is behaving optimally) must
adjust to every change in 0.
15 - Note that just the opposite occurs if C"' (I) < 0, in which case stochastic
fluctuations lead to an expected net reduction in adjustment cost, an increase
in long-run marginal cost, and a reduction in output.
III
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Figure 4 - Effect of Uncertainty, C"' (I) > 0
Figure 5 - Expected Output and Cost, C"' (I) = 0
'it
I 0 EAl=o]
K
__
AC O
L91
- 19 -
So far we have assumed that the firm is risk-neutral. Let us now
examine the impact of uncertainty if the firm is risk-averse, i.e. it max-
imizes the integral of the flow of discounted utility, U()e = Ud(t),
with U' > 0 and U" < 0. We assume that U is quadratic, i.e. U"' = 0, and that
p is linear in , i.e. uncertainty is additive and/or multiplicative.
The solution in this case is similar to that of Section 4, and is pre-
sented in Appendix A. (Td is replaced by Ud in the equation analogous to (17).)
There we show that the equation defining the (l/dt)EtdI = 0 isocline is given
by:
U' () MR*FK + U"(T)[v + C'(I)]MR-FK(I - 6K)K K
+ 
1 2 (0)I{U' (II)C"' (I) - 3U"(T)C"(I) v + C'(I)]} = (r +6)U'(fl)[v+C'(I)]
(23)
Now note that since U" < 0, if C"' (I) = 0, the effect of increasing uncer-
tainty is unambiguously to shift the (1/dt)E dI = 0 isocline upwards, and
thus increase the expected equilibrium capital stock and output level. (If
C"' (I) > 0 it reinforces this effect from risk aversion, and if C"' (I) < 0 it
counteracts it.)
Thus if marginal adjustment costs are rising at a constant or increasing
rate, the risk-averse firm will always maintain a larger capital stock and
higher output level under uncertainty. The reason for this is similar to
that for the risk-neutral firm with C"' (I) > 0. If C"'(I) = 0, the fluctuations
in I resulting from zero-mean fluctuations in will not (on average) raise
marginal adjustment cost, but with U" < 0 they will cause a loss in marginal
utility, since gains in marginal utility from decreases in I (which reduce
adjustment costs) will be more than offset by the losses from increases in I.
III
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The firm again has an incentive to maintain a larger stock of capital
and thereby reduce this loss of marginal utility. As can be seen from
eqn. (23), in equilibrium (where I - K = 0), the marginal benefit from
the last unit of capital again has two components, the marginal utility
coming from the marginal revenue product of the unit, and the expected
gain in marginal utility resulting from reduced upward adjustments in the
capital stock.
6. The Use of Inventories
Inventories, of course, provide another meansby which a firm can
respond to stochastic demand fluctuations, and depending on storage costs
and the size of the fluctuations, drawing down or adding to inventories
may be preferable to changing output capacity significantly. Since the
availability of inventories is likely to reduce the extent to which the
firm must continually adjust its output capacity in response to demand
fluctuations, the extent to which the optimal equilibrium output capacity
is altered by uncertainty should likewise be reduced. Here we show that
while those alterations in equilibrium output are indeed reduced by the
availability of inventories (especially if inventory holding costs are
small relative to capacity adjustment costs), the alterations should still
occur, and they will still have the same signs as they do without inventories.
To include the use of inventories in our model we consider a risk-
neutral firm that produces at a rate X = F(L,K), and sells at a rate q,
so that X - q represents the rate of flow into the stock of inventories
N. Assuming that the firm faces a constant inventory storage cost of k
16 - The results are basically the same for a risk-averse firm, but the algehra
is more complicated and no more enlightening.
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per unit, discounted profits are:
lld(t) = [p(q,e)q - wL - vI - C(I) - kN]e- rt (24)
The firm's maximization problem is now:
co
max E T d(t)dt (25)
subject to K = I - 6K (26)
N=X - q (27)
and dO = (8)dz = (e)E(t) dE (28)
with L, I, q, N > 0.
Note that the firm now chooses its level of sales q in addition to its
factor inputs (which in turn determine its output). Since price and
quantity are related by the demand function and the market is assumed to
clear, this is equivalent (for a monopolistic firm) to choosing price.
Thus, the distinction made by Leland (1972) between a price-setting and a
quantity-setting firm does not apply here.
The solution to this problem follows the same approach used in Section
4, and is presented in Appendix B. There we show that the expected dynamics
of investment is again given by eqn. (21), and also that the expected rate
of change of marginal revenue (price for the competitive firm) is given by
(l/dt)E dMR < rMR + k (29)
with N = 0 if the inequality holds, and N > 0 if (29) holds with equality.
Eqn. (29) is a standard arbitrage condition which says that if the expected
capital gain from a unit of inventory exceeds the holding cost of the unit,
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additional units should be added to inventory rather than sold (which in
turn will raise the price and reduce the expected rate of growth of mar-
ginal revenue until (29) holds with equality). Conversely, no inventory
should be held if its holding cost exceeds the expected rate of capital gain.
In the deterministic case no inventories will be held unless an in-
crease in price is anticipated (e.g. inventories may be accumulated and later
decumulated during a period of rapid demand growth), so that in equilibrium
the inventory stock is always zero. With stochastic demand fluctuations,
however, an inventory stock may be held even in equilibrium. We show in
Appendix B that a non-zero mean inventory stock is held once the variance
of exceeds a critical value. At that critical value the adjustment cost
savings from the use of inventories as a buffer against demand fluctuations
(equivalent to a rate of capital gain) is just equal to the holding cost of
the inventory.
If inventories are held in equilibrium the optimal response of invest-
ment to stochastic changes in demand will be reduced, i.e. I will be smaller
(since inventories provide a partial substitute for capital stock adjust-
ments). However, Ie will still exceed zero, so that eqn. (21) will still
have the same implications for the effect of uncertainty on the equilibrium
capital stock and output level; if C"' (I) > (<) 0, demand uncertainty will
lead to an increase (decrease) in expected output (although the increase
or decrease will be smaller than it would without inventories). Furthermore,
it can be shown that the basic results from the last section regarding risk
aversion still apply if the firm holds inventories, i.e. with C"' (I) > 0,
risk aversion will lead to a higher level of output if there is demand ucer-
tainty.
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7. Conclusions
This paper has treated the behavior of the firm under demand uncer-
tainty as a problem that is inherently dynamic, both in terms of the
nature of the uncertainty itself, and in terms of the constraints faced by
the firm. The uncertainty that we have been concerned with here is an
uncertainty over future demand, not current demand, with the degree of
uncertainty growing with the time horizon. As we have seen, this kind of
uncertainty can be characterized by allowing the demand function to be
driven over time by a stochastic process. Furthermore, the firm's optimal
behavior is affected by this uncertainty because of the adjustment costs
associated with changes in factor input levels, and therefore the effects
of uncertainty must be studied in the context of a dynamic model of the
firm - whether or not one assumes that the firm is permitted to carry in-
ventories.
This approach is quite different from that of most earlier papers, and
our results are also quite different. We have seen that the effects of de-
mand uncertainty on the firm's behavior depend strongly on the characteristics
of adjustment costs. In particular, we have shown that a risk-neutral firm
will (in expected value terms) maintain a larger (smaller) capital stock
and produce more (less) on average if marginal adjustment costs are rising
at an increasing (decreasing) rate with the level of capital accumulation.
In addition, demand uncertainty causes a risk-averse firm to produce more
on average, even if marginal adjustment costs rise at a constant rate.
Furthermore these results are quite robust, and hold whether the firm is
competitive or monopolistic, whether or not the firm holds inventories, and
whether uncertainty affects demand additively or multiplicatively.
III
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Of course one might argue about the importance of the type of demand
uncertainty considered in this paper. In practice most firms must indeed
worry about-uncertainty over current demand as well as future demand, and
they may face stochastic fluctuations in demand that are not always con-
tinuous in time. However, at the very least future demand uncertainty
should be as important to the firm as current uncertainty, and it is there-
fore important to understand how it is likely to affect the firm's behavior.
As for stochastic fluctuations that are discontinuous in time, a natural ex-
tension of this paper would be to allow the demand function to be driven
by a "jump" process instead of (or in addition to) a continuous-time process.
An important limitation of this paper is its assumption that markets
clear instantaneously, so that there is never any excess demand or supple
of the good. Several recent papers have examined the characteristics of
market equilibrium when consumers face some probability of being unable to
purchase the good, but these papers do not consider uncertainty (current or
future) over the demand function itself. It would be useful to extend
the model developed here to allow for market clearing that is slow or incom-
plete.
17 - See Carlton (1978) and Gould (1978).
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Appendix
A. Behavior of the Risk-Averse Firm
Here we show that if the firm maximizes a quadratic utility function
(U"' = 0) and if p is linear in 0, eqn. (23) defines the (l/dt)EtdI = 0
isocline for the risk-averse firm. First, defining the optimal value function
J(K,O,t) = max E t U[I(T)]e dT, (A.1)
L,I t
and then going through the same steps as in Section 4, it is easy to show
that eqn. (17) now becomes
(l/dt)E t (U d/I) = aUd/3K + 6aUd/aI (A.2)
-rt
with Ud = U(I)e . Taking the partial derivatives and substituting into
(A.2), we have
rU' (1) [v + C' (I)] - v(l/dt)EtdU' (I) - (l/dt)Etd[U' (11)C' (I)]
= U' ()MR FK - U' ()6[v + C' (I)] (A.3)
Next the differentials dU' (1) and d[U' ()C' (I)] must be expanded using
Ito's Lemma:
dU' = :U"MRFK (I - K)dt - U"[v + C']dI - U"C"(dI) .(A.4)
and d(U'C') = C'U" MR'FK(I - K)dt - [C'U"(v + C') - U'C"]dI
1 C'C"U" + C'U"( + C"') - U'C"'](dI)2 (A.5)
2 2
Noting that Et(dI) = C (e)I0dt, substituting (A.4) and (A.5) into (A.3) and
rearranging, we obtain the equation (analogous to eqn. (21)) describing the
expected dynamics of investment:
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[U'C" - (v + C') U"] (l/dt)EtdI (r + 6)U' (v " C') - U'MR*F
t K
- U"(v + C')MRFK(I - 6K) - 2 (e)I[U'C' - 3C"U"(v + C')] (A.6)
Eqn. (23) follows from setting (l/dt)EtdI = 0.
B. The Use of Inventories
It is easy to show that eqns. (21) and (29) hold when the firm's max-
imization problem is given by eqns. (24) to (28). Defining the optimal
value function J = J(K,N,e,t) as before, the fundamental equation of opti-
mality is:
1 2
0 = max [Id(t) + Jt + (I - 6K)JK + (X -q)JN + 2a ()J8e] (B.1)
L,I,q
Maximizing with respect to L gives w = MR * FL as before. To see that eqn. (21)
again holds, go through exactly the same steps as in Section 4. Eqn. (17)
will again hold, and substituting for nd/~K and 1Td/;I and expanding dC'(I)
using Ito's Lemma again leads to eqn. (21) (although I will be smaller in
magnitude if an inventory stock is maintained in equilibrium).
To obtain eqn. (29), maximize (B.1) with respect to q:
a3d/9q = JN (B.2)
i.e. the marginal profit from selling a unit of output should just equal the
sume of all expected future discounted increases in profit resulting from
adding the unit to inventory. Now differentiate eqn. (B.1) with respect to
N and note that the resulting equation can be written as:
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3ad/aN + (l/dt)Etd(JN) = 0 (B.3)
Apply the differential operator (1/dt)Etd( )to both sides of (B.2) and com-
bine the resulting equation with (B.3) to eliminate JN:
(l/dt)Etd(Td/q) + ad/aN = 0 (B.4)
Now simply substitute the partial derivatives of nd into (B.4) to obtain
eqn. (29), and note that the inequality results from the constraint thatN > 0.
In the deterministic case the firm will hold no inventories in equili-
brium (since demand, and hence price, are fixed). However a firm facing
stochastic demand fluctuations may hold inventories in equilibrium if the
variance of the fluctuations is large enough. To see this, consider a com-
petitive firm and assume for simplicity that d C(I)/dI = 0 for i > 4. Now
expand p = p(q,O) using Ito's Lemma to obtain
dt t dp Etdq + 1 2 () (B.5)
But q = q (K,N,8), so that
(l/dt)Etd q = FK(I - 6K) + 2 (B.6)
- K 2 (0) q0 8 (B.6)
Now substitute (B.5) and (B.6) into (29), and note that I = 6K in equilibrium.:
1 2() [q (ap/q) + a2p/ae2] < rp + k (B.7)
N > 0 only if (B.7) holds with equality, and this in turn provides the mini-
mum value of a (8) above which inventories will be held in equilibrium.1 8
18 - Unfortunately we could not obtain an analytical expression for q (we only
know that q < 0 since2 C"(I) > 0), so that (B.7) really only says a parti-
cular minimum value of a exists, and that it depends positively on r, p, and k
and inversely on the terms in the brackets.
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